State of Utah v. Gary Rowan Butler : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1976
State of Utah v. Gary Rowan Butler : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Phillip L. Foremaster; Patrick H. Fenton; Attorneys for Appellant.
Vernon B. Romney; Attorney General; Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Butler, No. 14318.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1976).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/263
•
JOCUWErjT " • --VL 
KFU 
45.9 
•*9 
f
«CK£T NO. ^yr/ 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs-
GARY ROWAN BUTLER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
^ € 5 ^ 
VERNON ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
PHILLIP L. FOREMASTER 
494 East Tabernacle Street 
P.O. Box 572 
St. George, Utah 84770 
PATRICK H. FENTON 
13 West Hoover Avenue 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Attorneys for 
Defendant and Appellant 
H I E D 
4 U G 1 9 1976 
I 
• Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENT : 
r c i g a • 
STATKM-: ••• Kl'ND OF CASF 1 
DISPOSITION. 0:/ L.OWFR COIW . . . . . . . I 
RELIEF r.C • M'i'EAL . 1 
,-• VTEMENT .,- FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. 9 
ARGUMENT . . 9 
POIM'i i-wE TKIAL COURT ERRED IN .•.<JI •.'••.:i-i i..U i'fl£ 
STATE TO ELECT UNDER WHICH SUisJi-.C; -:;J OF THE 
MANSLAUGHTER STATUTE THE DEF'ENDANT WAS TO BE 
TRIED UPOI, 12 
POINT "M . ];, vlfrW O, i'ht, .VO-.i ... 01« THE INFORMATION, Tiii. 
COURT ERRED IN NO'j • i..guIRING THE STATE TO FILE 
A MORE SPECIFIC BILL OF PARTICULARS SETTING 
FORTH THE EXACT FACTS IT INTENDED TO PROV^ 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT *™ TRTA" . j_* -
POINT 113 . urs CO-J*c'.i EKRED IN EXCUSING CERTAIN MEMBERS 
OF THE JURY VENIRE PRIOR TO TRIAL A'.'!) mTW" 
HEARING WIT}I THE DEFENDANT PRESENT AN: • 
WITHOUT DISCLOSING T^ THE DEFENDANT T'F-. -„;;yON 
FOR SUCH EXT "SAT . 1 
POINT J ••. i'i.. JJWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO AJL,L0W 
CLicTAIN EVIDENCE INTO THE RECORD AND BEFORE 
THE JURY GOING TO THE STATE OF MIND OF THE 
DEFENDANT ON THE BASIS OF HEARSAY ^P 
OTHERWISE . . . - "> ° 
P.'"-"" TJtiJJ TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWliv • . i'A u\ 
EVIDENCE INTO THE RECORD AND BEFi .-• '• HP JURY 
BECAUSE OF LACK OF PROPER FOUNDATION . . . 
CONCLUSION 
AUTHORITIES 
42 . v , 
Simpsuw v. Ej.gnth J u d i c i a l J udi c i a I jJitj_t r±^ <, c o u r t (Nevada 
1.973) 503 , P . 2d 1225 ".' ; 7~ ~ . T~7~7 ' 
i Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AUTHORITIES CITED 
(con't) Page 
12 
12 
11 
10 
13 
, ** onn 350 P.2d 619 
, H960) 10 Utah 2d 200, -^u 
O+.-.^ P v. Courtney U ^ u ' 
- ^ ^ ^ 9 6 0 ) 10 Utah 2d 58, 348 P. 2d 340 . 
S^ate_v^ffirL_(1960)
 2 9 7 p 2 d 2 27 . . 
T Z e s
 ( 1 956) 5 Utah 2d 101, 297 
. State_v-Sti£S5. V
 0 . - n 7 378 P 2d 352 . 
-, v M963) 14 Utah 2d 1 0 7 , 3 /» 
§ t a t e _ v ^ B X i ° £ ^ 1 9 6 3 ) 396 P 2d 872 
« 11964) 16 U t a h 2d 1 3 9 , 39b 
State_v^_Winter^ ( 1 9 6 4 ) 
! STATUTES CITED 
\ a 1953 as amended 76-2-103 . . 
utah Code Annotated 1953 l b 
*. * 1953 as amended 76 2 ^ z 
utah Code Annotated 1953 g, l 4 
* orated 1953 as amended 76 5 
Utah Code Annotated . . . . . . 12' l 3 
* o^ted 1953 as amended 77 21 
Utah Code Annotated
 1 7 . 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 63 - • • • ' ' 
15 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE 
GARY 
STATE 
-VS-
ROWAN 
OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
BUTLER, 
Defendant 
and 
and 
Respondent, ) 
Appellant. ) 
Case No. 14318 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a criminal case wherein the Defendant and Appellant 
was charged with and convicted of the offense of Manslaughter. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Defendant and Appellant was convicted of the offense of 
Manslaughter by jury verdict returned on August 8, 1975. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant and Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction of 
Manslaughter 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant, Butler, from September 1, 1974 until February 18, 
1975, was a police officer employed by the City of St. George, Utah. 
(T. 1286). Prior to that time he had been employed as a reserve 
police officer for the City of St. George (T. 1286) and also was 
employed by Safeway Stores in both the Ogden and St. George, Utah 
areas (T. 1281). At the time of his employment as a police officer 
Butler was married to Alayne Butler (T. 1279) who was employed by 
the St. George Police Department as a dispatcher (T. 1287, 1288). 
During all of the time herein mentioned, the St. George City Chief 
of Police was one Joe Hutchings (T. 1289), who had a brother by the 
name of Gordon Hutchings who was also an employee of the City of 
St. George (T. 1296). Mr. Gordon Hutchings was employed by St. 
George as a mechanic (T. 1296) whose duties included keeping the 
City Police cars in proper repair (T. 1297). 
During the later part of November of 1974 or the early part 
of December of that same year Butler became aware of some type of 
relationship existing between Gordon Hutchings and his wife, Alayne 
Butler (T. 1297). He developed reason to believe that this 
relationship was more than casual and began doing various and sund 
things to check into it (T. 1298). In addition, he received an 
anonymous letter signed "your fellow police officer" that warned \ 
sexual relations were occuring between Gordon Hutchings and Butle: 
wife (T. 1301). Butler questioned his wife at times about the 
relationship but she denied that any existed (T. 1314). Butler a 
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at times, caught his wife in what he considered to be lies about 
the relationship which was upsetting to him (T. 1314). 
On the evening of December 7, 1974 (T. 1315) Butler discovered 
that his wife, Gordon Hutchings and one Jim Shelton had traveled to 
Pine Valley, a small resort town north of St. George for purposes 
of having a "party" (T. 1317). He discussed the matter with his 
police sergeant (T* 1324) and at two o'clock that morning had a 
discussion with his wife upon her return (T. 1327). She, in effect, 
told him it was none of his business (T. 1327). On or about the 
18th of December, 1974 Butler reported the relationship of Gordon 
Hutchings and Alayne Butler to Hutchings' wife (T. 1324). Thereafter 
Mrs. Hutchings was kept fairly advised of the goings on between the 
parties. 
Sometime around the 28th of December, 1974 Butler found a note 
in his wife's desk (T. 1343) signed by "Z", which was the nickname 
of Gordon Hutchings (T. 1344), which told Mrs. Butler that he, Gordon 
Hutchings, loved her (T. 1346). Later Butler discovered his wife 
and Hutchings meetin in the so-called "police lounge" at the 
St. George Police station (T. 1352). 
On January 1, 1975 Butler went to the home of Gordon Hutchings 
and asked him to stay away from his wife (T. 1357). At that time 
Hutchings threatened Butler if he ever came back to the Hutchings 
home (T. 1358). On January 2, 1975, Butler complained to his Chief 
of Police, Joe Hutchings, about the affair his brother was having 
with Butler's wife, and Hutchings told him that if any further 
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made to Butler by Hutchings directly and through Mrs* Hutchings, 
certain other parties advised Butler that he could be in trouble 
with Hutchings (T. 1388). 
On February 14, 1975 Mrs. Butler advised her husband that the 
affair between her and Hutchings was over (T. 1407). The following 
day Hutchings advised Butler of the same thing (T. 1409). 
On February 18, 1975 Butler spent the day with his wife in 
cleaning out the parties1 trailer at Washington, Utah, a small 
community about five miles east of St. George (T. 1413). At about 
seven o'clock p.m. the Butlers went to Mrs. Butler's apartment in 
St. George for dinner (T. 1415) and Butler returned to his trailer 
in Washington to change clothes at ten minutes to nine that evening 
(T. 1416). The reason for the change of clothes was that Butler 
went on duty as a St, George City policeman at 10:00 that evening 
(T. 1416). Mrs. Butler remained in the apartment (T. 1417) and 
Butler attempted to call her there about ten minutes after he left 
but Mrs. Butler was not home (T. 1417). In fact, Gordon Hutchings 
was waiting until Butler left outside the apartment so that he could 
meet with Mrs. Butler (T. 1129). Butler thereupon put on his police 
uniform (T. 1417) and traveled to St. George and went to his wife's 
apartment (T. 1417). He observed that her car was not at home 
(T. 1418) and then went to the police station and picked up his 
police car (T. 1418). Butler thereupon called Mrs. Hutchings and 
advised her he thought Hutchings and his wife were together (T. 1419) 
and then started looking for Alayne Butler and Hutchings (T. 1419). 
He checked various and sundry places he thought his wife might be 
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and then returned to the St. George police station. 
During the course of the evening and prior to the time Butler 
returned to the police station, one Tom Semmons, a patrolman hired 
by the residents of Bloomington had discovered a Mustang automobile 
in an isolated part of the Bloomington Hills area of Washington 
County (T. 1247). He called for a registration check of the vehicle 
and found the vehicle to be a Mustang registered to Gary Butler 
(T. 1248). The police dispatcher at the time was one Sharlene 
Squire (T. 1423) who knew that the Butler car was at Bloomington 
Hills (T. 1423). 
Upon his return to the police station Butler threatened to go 
to Pine Valley to look for the couple (T. 1424) and at that time 
Squire told him where his car was (T. 1424). Butler was very upset 
at the time (T. 1423, 1424). Butler proceeded to Bloomington, 
talked to officer Semmons and then proceeded to the Bloomington 
Hills area (T. 1428). On his way, he passed a vehicle coming in the 
opposite direction which contained Gordon Hutchings (T. 1431) and 
then proceeded further and caught up with his wife going in another 
direction (T. 1432). He followed her into St. George and to her 
apartment (T. 1433). 
At the apartment the Butlers got into an argument (T. 1435) 
and Butler then called Mrs. Hutchings and advised her that the par 
had been together (T. 1437). He then handcuffed his wife with his 
police handcuffs (T. 1438), removed her clothing and satisfied hin 
that she had recently had intercourse (T. 1439). At that time 
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Mrs. Butler admitted for the first time that she had had intercourse 
with Hutchings that evening (T. 1439). Butler became very upset 
(T. 1440) and then the telephone rang and it was Mrs. Hutchings 
asking to speak to Alayne Butler. At eleven fifteen Butler left 
his wife's apartment and went to the home of Joe Pfoutz, his 
police sergeant. He took off his badge and name tag and gun belt 
and told Pfoutz he was resigning (T 1444, 1445). Pfoutz took 
Butler's gun and removed the bullets from it (T. 1445). Butler then 
asked for his gun back, it being the only portion of the property 
removed that belonging to him, and Pfoutz returned it. (T. 1446). 
Butler replaced the bullets in the gun, placed it in his pants belt 
and left (T. 1446). He returned to his wife's apartment and continued 
the argument (T. 1447) and received a telephone call from Hutchings 
although did not talk to him and hung up the telephone (T. 1448). 
Butler thereupon left his wife's apartment with the intent in mind of 
returning the police car to the office, picking up his pickup and 
leaving the area permanently (T. 1448). During all of the time in 
question Butler was very upset and somewhat irrational (T. 1142). 
During the time that Butler was checking out his wife and 
resiging Hutchings returned to his home (T. 360). Mrs. Hutchings 
had packed his suitcase (T. 359) and subsequently asked him to leave 
which he did (T. 360). Hutchings subsequently returned to the home 
about eleven o'clock p.m. (T. 360). 
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As Butler proceeded to the police station he decided to 
report to Mrs. Hutchings what he had found out and thereupon 
proceeded to the Hutchings' home (T« 1449). The Hutchings1 home 
was on the route to the police station (T. 1450). Upon his arrival 
at the home he observed Hutchings' pickup parked backwards in front 
of the home with its lights on and the engine running (T. 1450). 
He left his car and walked up and knocked on the door (T. 1452). 
He heard a loud male voice that sounded like an argument (T. 1454) 
and walked off the porch of the home (T. 1454). Hutchings came to 
the door, saw Butler, and rushed at him with his arms out (T. 1454, 
1455). The testimony that Hutchings rushed at Butler is verified 
by Mrs. Hutchings as well as in Butler's testimony. (For Mrs. 
Hutchings' testimony, see the transcript at pages 365, 366, 446, 44 
449). Mrs. Hutchings, the only eye witness to the happening, also 
testified that she thought there would be a fight (T. 450) and 
that her husband went at Butler as though he were going to hit him 
(T. 450), and that Hutchings, rather than Butler, was the aggressoi 
(T. 451). Up to this point Butler had made no moves against Hutch: 
(T. 450). 
As Hutchings approached Butler, who was standing on the lawn 
in front of the house (T, 1454), he was yelling at Butler (T. 145 
Butler thereupon pulled his gun from his belt and shot at Hutchinc 
(T. 1455). Butler did not remember anything that happened after • 
(T, 1456), except that Hutchings ran back through the door of his 
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house (T. 1456). The state's evidence was that Hutchings ran 
around the house with Butler following him and shooting at him, 
although the foundation ofr this evidence is weak as will be 
subsequently pointed out in argument. Hutchings was hit by four 
bullets (T. 815) and subsequently passed away in his home from 
loss of blood. (T. 827). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING THE STATE TO ELECT 
UNDER WHICH SUBSECTION OF THE MANSLAUGHTER STATUTE THE DEFENDANT 
WAS TO BE TRIED UPON. 
The Information filed against the Appellant pleaded and alleged 
all three subsections of the mansluaghter statute as contained in 
76-5-205 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in the alternative 
(R. 88, 89). Appellant filed a motion to require the State to elect 
under which subsection of the statute he would be tried under 
(R, 93, 94) but the lower court, after argument, refused to require 
such election (R. 95). In addition, the Court, in its jury 
instructions, charged the jury that it could find the Appellant 
guilty of any three fo the fact situations contained in the 
manslaughter statute (R. 298, 299, 301, 302, 319). In addition, 
the Court submitted the matter to the Jury on three separate jury 
verdict forms as set forth in each subsection of the manslaughter 
statute (R. 320, 321, 322). The Information was not alleged in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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counts* Going along with this defect is the fact that a demand 
for Bill of Particulars was filed (R. 91, 92) and one was furnished 
(R. 98-165), but no statement of facts the Plaintiff intended to 
prove was contained therein. Defendant made objection to this 
(R. 169, 170) but no correction was made. 
The allegations contained in an Information must be sufficient 
to advise the accused of the accusation against him. 42 CJS 958 
The accusations agasint the accused must be 
sufficient to (a) identify the accused of the offense 
with which he is sought to be charged, (b) protect 
the accused from being twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense, (c) enable the accused to prepare for trial, 
and (d) enable the court, on conviction, to pronounce 
sentence according to the rights of the case. 42 CJS 959. 
In general, the offense charged must be clearly 
set forth in ordinary, plain, concise language, sufficient 
to inform a person of common understanding of what is 
intended, protect his rights, and so that the Court can 
pronounce a proper judgment and the charge be understood 
by the jury . . . 42 CJS 965. 
An indictment, information or complaint must 
directly and positively allege the commission by 
accused of the crime charged and every fact necessary 
to constitute it. 42 CJS 972. 
A murder indictment which merely alleged that accused 
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with malice aforethougl 
killed a victim enable the prosecutor to change theories at 
will, and therefore afforded no notice of what the 
accused would be required to meet, and therefore denied 
the accused's fundamental rights. Simpson v. Eighth 
Judicial District Court (Nevada 1973) 503 P. 2d 1225. 
A Defendant is entitled to be charged with a specific crime 
so that he may know the nature and cause of the accusation againsl 
him. State v. Taylor (1963) 14 Utah 2d 107, 378 P. 2d 352. 
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An Information must be sufficient to notify 
the Defendant of the charge against him so that he is 
able to prepare a defense, to identify the offense so 
that Defendant can successfully interpose a double 
jeopardy plea, and to apprise the court of the issues 
before it so that the Court can properly rule on 
questions of evidence and determine sufficiency thereof. 
State v. Stites (1956) 5 Utah 2d 101, 297 P 2d 227. 
The Information filed against Butler (R. 88, 89) charged him 
with Manslaughter either by causing the death of Gordon Hutchings 
recklessly or under extreme emotional disturbance or under 
circumstances wherein Butler reasonably believed he had a moral or 
legal justification or extenuation for his conduct. This placed 
Butler and his attorneys in the position of defending against three 
separate theories of the State's lawsuit. In addition, it gave the 
prosecution the right to elect under which theory it was going to 
proceed under, a situation found by the Nevada Court to be a 
violation of the accused's rights as set forth in the Simpson case 
above mentioned. This problem, combined with the failure of the 
State to set forth in its Bill of Particulars and Amended Bill of 
Particulars the specific facts it intended to prove against the 
Defendant resulted, in the opinion of the Defendant, in a violation 
of his fundamental Constitutional rights. In addition, by using 
the shotgun approach, as the State did in this case, the jury was 
called on to make its own election, a situation which well could 
have been misleading to it. 
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One further point. The Defendant, because of the wording of 
the information, was called upon to defend against what in effect 
were three separate accusations without being advised as to which, 
if any, the State intended to prove at trial. Such situation, 
therefore, resulted in the Defendant being put to trial without 
knowing what specific accusation, if any, he had to defend against. 
POINT II 
IN VIEW OF THE WORDING OF THE INFORMATION, THE COURT ERRED IN 
NOT REQUIRING THE STATE TO FILE A MORE SPECIFIC BILL OF PARTICULARS 
SETTING FORTH THE EXACT FACTS IT INTENDED TO PROVE AGAINST THE 
DEFENDANT AT TRIAL. 
The error assigned in this particular point on appeal dove-
tails in with the assignment of error set forth in Point I above. 
The Appellant, pursuant to law (77-21-9 UCA 1953; State v. Lyman 
(1960) 10 Utah 2d 58, 348 P. 2d 340; State v. Courtney (1960) 
10 Utah 2d 200, 350 P. 2d 619) filed a demand for a Bill of Particu-
lars (R. 91, 92). In such demand, it asked for all evidence agains 
the Defendant (R. 91). A Bill of Particulars was filed (R. 98-165) 
but it did not state what the fact situation was that the State 
intended to prove at trial. The Defendant thereupon filed a motio: 
for a re-hearing of its previous Motion to Require an Election und 
which theory of the Manslaughter statute the State intended to 
proceed upon (R. 17 6-17 8) which motion was based upon, at least ii 
part, the failure of the State to set forth what it intended to p: 
in its Bill of Particulars. The State thereupon filed an Amendme 
Bill of Particulars (R- 183-184), but still did not set forth the 
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facts it intended to prove. The Court on argument of the Motion 
for Re-Hearing, denied the same (R. 200). A further Amendment to 
Bill of Particulars was filed by the State (R. 220), but it again, 
did not set forth the facts to be proved at trial. 
The purpose of a Bill of Particulars is to inform 
the Defendant of the particulars of the offense 
sufficiently to enable him to prepare his defense . . . 
State v. Winters (1964) 16 Utah 2d 139, 396 P. 2d 872. 
It must inform the Defendant of the particulars of the offense 
sufficiently to enable him to prepare his defense. 77-21-9 UCA 1953. 
The Bill of Particulars and its amendments filed by the 
prosecution in the Butler case do not do this. It does list the 
witnesses that may be used at trial and gives certain copies of 
witnesses' statements and other evidencary reports, however there is 
no commitment that any or all of these items will be presented at 
trial, or what ones, if any, will be. This defect, combined with the 
allegations set forth in the Information as above mentioned, placed 
the Defendant in the position of not knowing what he was to defend 
against. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCUSING CERTAIN MEMBERS OF THE JURY VENIRE 
PRIOR TO TRIAL AND WITHOUT HEARING WITH THE DEFENDANT PRESENT AND 
WITHOUT DISCLOSING TO THE DEFENDANT THE REASON FOR SUCH EXCUSAL. 
The jury venire list for the Butler case is found in the 
record at pages 237 through 239. Those names opposite to which 
certain red writing is found were excused for one reason or another 
at the time the trial jury was being selected. Certain of the jury 
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venire did not appear for jury selection and opposite their names 
is the word "removed" in black writing (R. 193, 194). Defendant 
filed a Motion for Disclosure as to why such persons were removed 
from the jury venire (R. 191, 192). The only action taken by the 
Court was a direction by it to "obtain such information from the 
Court Reporter" (R. 233). At no place in the record is there a 
statement by the court as to why these persons were removed by the 
judge and as a practical matter it is the position of the Defendant 
stated on information and belief, that the Court never made a record 
as to why these people were excused from the venire. Certainly such 
action was taken by the Court out of the presence of the Defendant 
although the people who were so "removed" were duly selected 
according to law to sit on the Butler venire. 
It is the position of the Defendant that the named persons shou 
not have been removed without a hearing in front of the Defendant, 
or at least, disclosure should have been made to show why they were 
removed. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW CERTAIN EVIDENCE 
INTO THE RECORD AND BEFORE THE JURY GOING TO THE STATE OF MIND OF 
THE DEFENDANT ON THE BASIS OF HEARSAY OR OTHERWISE. 
The Utah Manslaughter statute, as contained in 7 6-5-205, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953 as amended, by its very nature and wording pla 
into issue the state of mind of the accused and the reasonableness 
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or propriety of his actions. In addition, because of the fact 
situation involved in the Butler case and because of the fact that 
Hutchings in fact attacked Butler, the element of self-defense was 
present. The trial court recognized that the jury could properly 
consider the defense of self-defense as it gave the jury three 
instructions in that regard (R, 306, 307, 308). In Utah, of course, 
the defense of self-defense is defined and recognized in 76-2-402, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended and the definitions of the 
various key words used in the manslaughter statute are defined in 
76-2-103. As a result, and because of the wording of the manslaughter 
statute and the statutes and jury instructions on self-defense, the 
state of mind of the accused became an issue and the jury was called 
upon to determine it and the propriety of his actions. 
At various places in the record there appear situations in 
which the defense attempted to get into evidence certain sexual 
indiscretions of Alayne Butler. The lower court took the position 
that unless Butler had knowledge of such acts prior to the death 
of Hutchings that such evidence was not proper to present to the jury. 
This position was probably correct. There are instances however, 
going both to the sexual indiscretions of Mrs. Butler and to threats 
made by Hutchings against Butler that Butler knew about and the 
court refused to let this evidence before the jury. In this regard, 
it is the position of the Defendant that such evidence should have 
been allowed in the record. 
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At one point in the Defendant's testimony he commenced to 
testify as to a conversation he had had with his wife wherein 
she was going to tell him of a conversation she had had with one 
Marvin Jones about threats made by Hutchings to Jones against Butler 
(T. 1388). The State objected on the basis of hearsay (T. 1388)f am 
the Court sustained the objection (T. 1388, 1389). The Defendant 
thereupon requested to make a proffer of proof for the record 
outside the hearing of the jury as to the evidence claiming that 
the testimony would go to the state of mind of the Defendant 
(T. 1389). The Court allowed this and the jury was excused. Butler 
testified that his wife had told him that Marvin Jones had told her 
that Hutchings made threats against Butler and his physical 
well being and had warned Mrs. Butler to keep Butler away from 
Hutchings (T. 1390, 1391). The Court sustained the State's 
objection and refused to allow the testimony before the jury (T. 13? 
Immediately after this ruling the jury was called back and Butler 
proceeded to testify as to the same conversation with his wife. He 
proceeded to tell what that conversation was, the State objected 
on the grounds of hearsay, the Court overruled and denied the 
objection,, and Mr. Butler testified that his wife had stated that 
Hutchings had threatened Butler with bodily harm (T. 1393, 1394). 
Obviously the above mentioned rulings of the lower court were 
inconsistent. It is the position of the Defendant that the lattei 
ruling was correct and that any testimony going to threats made b 
Hutchings against Butler that Butler knew about should have been 
- - — ^  ^ fore the jury. 
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Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence, defines hearsay and its 
exceptions. In effect, the Rule defines hearsay as an out of court 
statement offered to prove the truth of the matter stated. If the 
Court will examine the trial transcript setting forth the above 
two mentioned rulings of the court it will note that throughout the 
presentation of this testimony counsel for Defendant mentioned several 
times that the conversations and their substance were not being 
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated, but were being 
offered to show the state of mind of the Defendant (T. 1388-1394). 
There is no question but that the state of mind of the Defendant was 
an issue both under the Manslaughter statute, the statute on self-
defense and under the jury instructions given to the jury by the 
Court. Also, the trial Court itself was inconsistent, refusing to 
let the statements into evidence at one time and immediately thereafter 
allowing the same type of evidence in. It can't be right in both 
instances. 
It is difficult for an appellant Court, reviewing a cold 
record, to get a feel of the emotions flowing in a case such as the 
Butler case. We have a situation wherein Butler was a young man 
employed by the same police department, with the wife having an 
affair with the brother of the chief of police. The record up to 
the time of the shooting shows many instances of Butler talking to 
his fellow officers about the matter, his attempts to stop the 
affair and his deep concern and emotional disturbance over the thing. 
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. i_~ n n r V -
POINT V POINT v 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING CERTAIN EVIDENCE INTO THE 
RECORD AND BEFORE THE JURY BECAUSE OF LACK OF PROPER FOUNDATION. 
The theory of the State's case was that Butler fired a shot 
or two toward Hutchings while both parties were on the front lawn 
of the Hutchings home and then followed Hutchings around to the Sou 
of the home still firing shots. Mrs. Hutchings, the only eye 
witness to the occurance, testified she heard two shots fired in 
front of the house and then went to call the police and didn't kno^  
what happened after that (T. 366). As mentioned abovef Butler cou 
not remember what happened after the first shot. As a result, the 
are no eye witnesses to what happened after the firing of the firs 
two shots. The State, therefore, to prove its theory, must rely Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the physical evidence available to it and must present said 
evidence so that it is relevant and properly connected to the 
Defendant. In other words, it must lay a proper foundation for its 
admission. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 is a frontal picture of the Hutchings 
home showing the front door, the lawn, and the South (left hand) 
side of the home with its attendant car parking area and a red 
Volkswagon automobile which will be mentioned later. Defendant did 
not object to its admission as an exhibit. Exhibit P-3 is another 
picture of the Hutchings home. 
Exhibit P-25 is the weapon used in the shooting and was 
identified as belonging to Butler (T. 534, 535). It is a Smith & 
Wesson .357 Magnum Revolver. Certain .357 cartridges were taken 
from the weapon and identified for purposes of the record as 
Exhibit P~26. It was the testimony of Mr. Blackburn, the FBI weapons 
expert, that Exhibit P-25 had fired the cartridges identified as 
Exhibit P-26. 
The officers making the investigation found a bullet slug at 
the scene identified as Exhibit P-32. They found a second bullet 
identified as Exhibit P-31 and a third identified as Exhibit P-30. 
A fourth bullet was identifed as Exhibit P-29- With the exceptions 
of Exhibit P-29, which was identified as being of .357 calibre, the 
expert identified the other bullets as being of .38 calibre. The 
testimony of Mr. Blackburn, the FBI expert was to the effect that 
he could not positively say that any of these bullets came from the 
weapon identified as belonging to Butler. The reason for this, 
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according to the expert, was that there were not sufficient marks 
on the bullets to make such an identification- This is extremely 
strange as an examination of at least three of the bullet exhibits 
will show them to be relatively undamaged. The Defendant objected 
to the admission of the bullet exhibits on the basis that they were 
not properly connected to the Defendant (T. 704). Also, Exhibit 
P-28 was a metal fragment found near the rear of the house and 
identified as a sliver of a bullet, however the witness could not 
say where it came from noi: could any other witness. Defendant 
objected to its admission on the basis that it could in no way be 
tied either to the Defendant or his weapon, which it was not (T. 704 
The Court allowed all of the bullet exhibits into evidence over the 
Defendant's objection (T. 708) although it obviously had reservatioi 
as to Exhibit P-28, the metal fragment found at the rear of the 
house (T. 708). 
It is Defendant's position that the allowing of these bullet 
exhibits into evidence, and especially P-28 found at the rear of t] 
home, constituted reversable error as they could not be connected 
with the Defendant. This is especially true with Exhibit P-28 as 
it could not be identified other than as a piece of a metal bullel 
slug and could not in any way be shown as coming from a gun of th< 
type owned by Butler. As the evidence showing that Butler went 
around the home to shoot at Hutchings must be circumstantial, the 
being no eye witnesses, this evidence must be properly tied to h: 
The metal fragment (Ex. P-28) could not have been placed there 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 21 -
Butler unless he had gone to the rear of the home, and as a result, 
to allow such damaging evidence into the record should necessitate 
more of a foundation than just the fact that such fragment existed, 
which is all the State presented. 
Exhibit P-7 is a photograph depicting the right rear fender and 
tire of a red Volkswagen (T. 721). This vehicle was located to the 
left rear of the Hutchings home. (See Exhibits P-2 and P-3). 
Defendant assumes that it was intended by the State by the introduc-
tion of this exhibit to show an alleged bullet hole in the rear 
fender. There is nothing in the record to show what caused the 
hole or when it was caused. Defendant objected to the receipt of this 
exhibit as evidence on the basis of improper foundation (T. 938, 939) 
but the same was overruled and denied by the Court and allowed 
into the record as an exhibit (T. 947). In this regard, it is 
interesting to note in examining the exhibit that the tire shown is 
flat and one would logically assume that if a bullet went through 
the fender that it casued the flat tire. Such was not the case, as 
the tire was. flat prior to the shooting and thus could not have been 
caused by Gary Butler or his gun. Defendant takes the position that 
the receipt of Exhibit P-7 was improper and constituted error in that 
no evidence is present as to what caused che hole in the fender or 
when it was caused. 
Exhibit P-14 is a picture of a metal container with a hole 
in it. This container was located to the left rear of the 
Hutchings home. The apparent theory of the State in offering this 
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exhibit was to show that Butler went to the left rear of the home 
shooting Hutchings. At no place in the record is there any 
testimony as to what caused the hole or when it was placed in the 
metal container. The court received the exhibit as evidence over 
Defendant's objections* The same reasoning applies to this exhibit 
as to Exhibit P-7 in that it was not connected in any manner with the 
Defendant and no cause was shown for its admission as an exhibit. 
By the admission of both Exhibit P-7 and Exhibit P-14 the Court 
allowed matters to come before the jury without proper foundation 
that could be misleading to the jury and highly prejudicial to the 
Defendant. 
Exhibits P-12, P-13 and P-14 were photographs introduced by 
the State to prove its theory that Hutchings in fact ran around to 
the rear of his home with Butler following. They were intended to 
depict alleged blood stains. At no place in the record is there 
anything that would indicate that the red stains show shown were 
blood. As a result, the Court, by admitting these three exhibits 
committed error in that they were not properly identified and no 
proper foundation was laid as to what they depicted. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that for the reasons above 
mentioned, the verdict of Guilty rendered against the Defendant in 
the lower court should be reversed and the Defendant be given a ne 
trial. 
Respectfully submitted. 
PATRICK H. FENTION PHILLIP L. FOREMASTS 
13 West Hoover Avenue 494 East Tabernacle 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 St. George, Utah 847 
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